Progressivism as, and as a Catalyst of, Liberalist Trends in Accomplishing Both Liberal and Conservative Ends

The Progressive ‘Movement’ of the early 19^th century was not in fact an actual movement of any sort—it was simply a trend of activity in the form of protests and agitations for reform, classified by their desire to improve society through change, and collectively labeled as a ‘Progressive Movement’ by subsequent historians. Because of such a broad classification, ‘Progressivism’ as a movement can not be accurately defined as either liberal or conservative—it incorporated reform movements for socialism, idealistic laissez-faire, and anarchy, among others, thereby encompassing all ends of the political spectrum. However, if we take the pragmatic assessment of Progressivism, to use an expression coined by the Progressive philosopher William James, we can define Progressivism in the political spectrum by the end results it achieved in the economic, social, and political realms.

Although at the surface, the economic Progressive movement seemed one of radical agitation by muckraking journalists and liberal industrial reform against industry by the government, it was, at its underlying aim of this agitation, mostly conservative in nature. It was not a liberal movement, in the sense that we define it today—it was not a push for imposition of equality (i.e. a mainstream movement for socialism or working-class welfare)—but rather a conservative movement, one whose aim was to return society to its bedrock of equality in the opportunity of success and happiness. Indeed, though there was a single liberal reform achieved in consumer protection, which manifested itself through such legislation as the Pure Food and Drug Act, and in the creation of the Food and Drug Administration, the main economic achievement of the era was President Theodore Roosevelt’s trust-busting, which sought to end the unfair and monopolistic practices of the industry. The entire economic policy of the late 18^th century was founded upon the ideals of laissez-faire capitalism and social Darwinism, that industry, under the laws of supply and demand and free market, would function perfectly to excel those of best ability, and that any government intervention would serve only to restrict this ability for individuals to succeed. In realistic implementation however, American industry had drifted far from this ideal, and at the turn of the century it was not government but the large, established businesses, with their financial concentration in a small group of Wall Street investors, who were using their growing clout and power over an industry to stifle competition and maintain market control, restricting the opportunity for individuals to succeed, the very principle at the foundation of laissez-faire Darwinism. In the creation of the Bureau of Corporations, which investigated these abusive trusts, and his extension of federal powers in pursuit of curbing the monopolistic and anticompetitive tactics of the trusts in the steel and railway industries, Theodore Roosevelt was attempting to restore fair competition and the opportunity for success for the ordinary American, which had been all but stifled by the trusts in the abuse of their financial clout. Later on, when President Woodrow Wilson came to power, he furthered the dissolution of financial concentration with tariff reform, allowing foreign competition; the establishment of the Federal Reserve, breaking the stranglehold of the New York banks upon industrial capital; and ultimately the creation of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to investigate and regulate abusive and anticompetitive trusts. Thus, the Roosevelt and Wilson administrations’ progressive achievements were rather conservative in that the progressive change implemented did not move industry to a new direction, but brought the American economy back, from the corrupt, oppressive corporate state that it had become, to a purer, more idealistic form of laissez-faire Darwinism that had been envisioned by the economic policies laid down in the 1870s.

Progressive thought also gave rise to the many social movements of the era, most notably social welfare, and the suffrage of women and minorities. As the effect of rampant laissez-faire Darwinism on the poor and urban became realized after the Panic of 1893, as well as through muckrake journalism and moral sympathy. Social programs, funded and operated privately, developed throughout American cities, and served as an early form of social welfare, mainly for poor immigrants, providing basic services such as shelter, hygiene, and education, albeit through privately philanthropic, not public, means. This, in turn, served to reinvigorate the movement for woman’s suffrage, as they not only gained purpose in their progressive achievements, but also a sense of equality in the feminist notion of gender freedom. By 1917, this push for women’s suffrage had led to suffrage in 12 states. In the civil rights struggle of African-Americans, progressives shifted from the passive policy of accommodation promoted by Booker T. Washington, staging the Niagra Falls meeting to establish a reform policy, forming organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and ultimately pursuing a much more aggressive path to African-American equality. In the social context, Progressivism certainly had liberalizing effects on reform, setting the groundwork for later social welfare through charitable programs, and transforming the course of equality movements from mere accomadationist policies to an active, coherent pursuit for social and civil egalitarianism.

Perhaps most far-reaching of all, was Progressivism’s effect on the political climate of the United States. City- and state-level progressives such as Wisconson Governor Robert La Folette made strides in their attempt to redemocraticize politics and break up the stranglehold of the political machines through such reforms as election primaries, referendums, recalls, and initiative measures; like trustbusting, it was a conservative aim in breaking the concentration of power and restoring the opportunity to gain such to the common man. However, the end result—the dissolution of the machines and spawning of special interests lobby groups—did little in terms of restoring political power to the common citizen who lacked political connections. The real accomplishment of Progressivism was its reform of politics on a national level. After Reconstruction ended, government activism and progress had ground to a standstill, deadlocked by the formalistic policies rooted in laissez-faire capitalism and social Darwinism. Laws and legislation were based on these principles, without regard to their practical effects on society. Thus, rulings such as Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), allowing racial segregation under the “separate but equal” doctrine, were passed, based solely on the sound rationale for the theory of equal separation, but in complete ignorance on the feasibility of implementing such in a racist society like that of turn-of-the-century America. The Progressive movement ushered in a new era of government reform by introducing the philosophy of pragmatism, judging an action strictly by its realistic results, freeing legislators from the constrictions of the formalistic laissez-faire Darwinistic dogma. The most dramatic effects of this change can be seen in labor regulation, beginning with the formalistic view taken in the Lochner v. New York (1905) decision, which, based on a broad definition of the 14^th Amendment guarantee of ‘liberty’, declared work-hour limit laws an infringement upon workers’ and employers’ right to contract. By 1908, however, pragmatism had so rooted itself into the logic of legislation and law, as well as the American public, that the Muller v. Oregon decision reversed course on Lochner, completely ignoring technical interpretation on the right to contract and instead basing the decision on the pragmatic assessment of work hour effects on the health, family life, and quality of production of the workers. In his trustbusting, Theodore Roosevelt, instead of formalistically pursuing every monopolistic trust as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act mandated, sought to intervene only against those which he considered abusively harmful to society, pragamatically assessing the worth of the trusts in a monopolistic form. Roosevelt’s recognition of the labor union in the anthracite miners’ dispute was also an example of the pragmatic assessment by Progressives of the era, ultimately choosing the course of action beneficial to society (thereby improving their welfare as well as ending the production stoppage) over the formalistic assessment that the union strike was in technical violation of the restraint of trade under the Sherman Anti Trust Act. The Roosevelt administration’s pragmatic policies in the early Progressive era culminated in the official restoration of the ‘rule of reason’ of common-law doctrine, in the United States v. Standard Oil (1911), which redefined the interpretation of the Sherman Anti Trust Act to include only those trusts of ‘unreasonable’ abuse, and later on, in the Wilson administration’s Clayton Anti Trust Act of 1914 and establishment of the FTC, which officially instituted ‘rule of reason’ into the Sherman Antri Trust Act and gave a federal agency power of discretion in its enforcement of the act. Progressivism had redefined completely the role of government in society, from a mostly passive body staunchly rooted in non-intervention, as its formalistic social Darwinism principles had demanded, to an activist government willing to make changes regardless of the means, if for an ultimate outcome resulting in a better society. Politically, the movement had destroyed the rigid minimalist government that laissez-faire had fostered in the latter 19^th century, ultimately giving rise to a new government open to reform and intervention and setting the nation on a path receptive of liberalist change.